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## ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

DEC 23 1965

Dear Dean:

You will recall my letter to you of July 1, 1966 and my letters to Adrian Fisher of February 14, 1966 and to William Foster of August 13, 1965, in each of which I expressed the importance attached by the AEC to inclusion in any non-proliferation treaty of a strong article calling for the acceptance of international safeguards by non-nuclear weapon states.

I have followed with great interest the reports from the U.S. delegation to the UN of the discussions with the Soviet delegation concerning international safeguards in the non-proliferation treaty. Those reports convey a strong impression that the Soviets would accept a mandatory safeguards provision for non-nuclear weapon signatories so long as it (1) did not require the USSR to accept safeguards upon any activities within the USSR and (2) did not appear to preserve Euratom safeguards as an equivalent to IAEA safeguards.

With respect to the first point, we had agreed that it would be preferable, from a presentational standpoint, to provide for safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon powers. Such a provision would not, however, be significant in the context of the undertakings of the parties to the treaty and could, in our view, be omitted in the interest of achieving agreement with the USSR.

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Mr. Dean Rusk

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The Euratom problem, on the other hand, poses a dilemma. The AEC has been an active partner with the Department of State in the inception and fostering of Euratom and we value highly that relationship and the practical benefits that we expect to realize from cooperation with Euratom. Our principal interest in Euratom has not been its safeguards system, but rather the promise it has held as a mechanism for bringing to bear the technical and industrial resources of its member states upon the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is clear that those collective resources, effectively coordinated, could accomplish more than the sum of the efforts of the individual members and could, in fact, match those of any of the nuclear-weapon countries. The attainment of this prospect does not depend upon a special status for Euratom's system of safeguards. As a matter of fact, the Department and the AEC have agreed, and I have stated publicly, that ultimately there should be a single system of international safeguards.

The non-proliferation treaty offers the best, and perhaps the last, opportunity for obtaining general acceptance among the non-nuclear weapon countries of international safeguards upon their indigenous nuclear activities. The importance of such an accomplishment to dealing with the proliferation problem seems to me to outweigh the importance of preserving a special status for Euratom safeguards.

For this reason, I concur in the general approach recommended by Bill Foster in Ambassador Goldberg's cable of November 30 (USUN 2817), that, after pressing hard for a safeguards article based upon the phrase "effective international safeguards" and finding no possibility of Soviet acceptance, we should accept language which refers only to "safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency", together with a publicly stated understanding between the U.S. and the USSR that a reasonable time would be permitted for all countries to accept IAEA safeguards.

*non nuclear weapon states*

I would expect that, if the situation is discussed with the Governments of the Euratom member states, most of them would recognize that their willingness to accept IAEA safeguards under a non-proliferation treaty, after a suitable period, may be instrumental in achieving broad acceptance of safeguards by non-nuclear weapon states. While France may take exception, one of the strengths of Euratom should be its ability to take a broader view than one of its member states.

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Hon. Dean Rusk

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I believe we should call upon the Euratom member states, in this instance, to exercise their responsibilities as a major collective peaceful nuclear power to support the non-proliferation effort, by making a gesture which should assure broad acceptance of international safeguards.

I would appreciate having the opportunity of discussing this matter with you prior to a final decision being reached.

Cordially,

Signed, Stuart T. Ladd

Chairman

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State

CC: William Foster, ACDA

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